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Experience
Michele Odorizzi is one of the Administrators of Mayer Brown’s Appellate group, and focuses her practice in appellate litigation and brief writing. She has argued cases before the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as the Illinois, Delaware, California and Nevada Supreme Courts and the Illinois Appellate Court. Her work before the United States Supreme Court includes merits and amicus briefs. Michele’s areas of focus in her appellate practice include constitutional issues, class actions, federal securities laws, consumer fraud claims, fiduciary issues, insurance, and regulatory issues, as well as general commercial litigation.
Clients tell Chambers USA (2007) that Michele’s thoughtful approach and superb judgment’ allow her to navigate many types of troubled waters. Chambers USA previously (2006) reported such comments from Michele’s clients as "...'incredibly talented'...'She is among the best brief writers I have ever seen'..." Michele was also selected by her peers for inclusion in The Best Lawyers in America (2008).
Michele initially joined Mayer Brown in 1977. She has served judicial clerkships with Justice John Paul Stevens, US Supreme Court (1979-1980) and The Honorable Philip W. Tone, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1976-1977).
Notable Engagements
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. DowBrands, Inc., No. 03-2572 (3d Cir.), argued June 23, 2004. Reprresented DowBrands in this appeal from a $30 million-plus judgment in favor of S.C. Johnson for alleged fraud in connection with the sale of DowBrands’ assets. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered entry of judgment in favor of DowBrands on the ground (among others) that S.C. Johnson could not claim that it had reasonably relied on representations that were not made in the contract in light of an non-reliance clause providing that the buyer had relied on, and the seller had vouched for, only those representations made in the contract.
FDIC v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 03-2619 (7th Cir.), argued November 3, 2003. Represented Ernse & Young when the FDIC had taken the unprecedented step of suing the firm in its corporate capacity for alleged negligence or fraud that supposedly contributed to the failure of Superior Bank and the loss of $500 million to the Savings Association Insurance Fund. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the FDIC could not sue in its corporate capacity and was required to sue, if at all, in its capacity as receiver. The FDIC appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed.
AES Corp. v. The Dow Chemical Co., No. 01-3373 (3d Cir.), argued May 23, 2002. Represented Dow Chemical in a securities fraud action brought by AES arising out of the sale of a partially owned Dow Chemical subsidiary to AES and another buyer. The district court granted summary judgment on behalf of Dow Chemical on the ground that AES could not demonstrate the necessary element of reliance because it had contractually agreed before offering a bid that it would not rely upon the projections and other representations that formed the basis of its fraud claim. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act (which prohibits advance waivers of compliance with the securities laws) precludes a court from treating a "non-reliance" clause as dispositive of the issue of reliance.
Fuqua v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 01-7974 (2d Cir.), argued March 21, 2002. Represented Ernst & Young in this action brought by a group of family members who agreed to merge their company with Graham-Field Health Products, Inc., which ultimately went into bankruptcy. After Graham-Field restated certain of its audited financial statements, the plaintiffs sued E&Y, claiming that they had been induced to exchange their stock in Fuqua Industries for Graham-Field stock by material misrepresentations in E&Y’s audit opinions. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that plaintiffs should have discovered their claims more than a year before the lawsuit was brought; plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal.
AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, No. 00-9472 (2d Cir.), argued November 27, 2001. Represented Ernst & Young in this action brought by purchasers of notes in JWP, Inc., which went bankrupt and caused plaintiffs to lose approximately $100 million. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of E&Y on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to prove the necessary element of loss causation. In an extraordinary three-way split, the Second Circuit vacated that decision and remanded for further findings. On remand, the district court reached the same conclusion after issuing additional findings further explaining its views. Plaintiffs appealed again; this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action.
In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Litigation, No. 01-1952 (7th Cir.), argued October 23, 2001). Represented Abbott Laboratories in this case against the Company’s directors, claiming that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care by allegedly failing to properly supervise the Company’s compliance with FDA regulations. The lawsuit was filed in the wake of a consent decree under which Abbott agreed to take a substantial number of diagnostic devices off the market until quality assurance issues could be resolved and agreed to pay the Government $100 million. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to make a demand on the Board or to plead sufficient facts to show that a demand would be futile. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, on the ground that plaintiffs' allegations that the Board was aware of FDA violations but took no action to ensure compliance were sufficient to avoid a motion of dismissal.
Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 01-1473 (7th Cir.), argued September 28, 2001. Represented the defendants in this Section 10(b) case brought on behalf of purchasers of Abbott stock. Plaintiffs alleged that the Company misled investors about the state of its compliance with regulatory requirements before it entered into the consent decree described above. The district court dismissed the complaint on a variety of grounds. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the plaintiffs had not pointed to any statement that was arguably false or misleading and had failed to demonstrate that the defendants had a duty to disclose the information allegedly concealed.
In re Synthroid® Marketing Litigation, No. 00-3164 (7th Cir.), argued April 20, 2001. Represented the defendants in this purported class action, in which the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants suppressed information about whether other drugs can be substituted for Synthroid®, supposedly injuring consumers by causing them to pay more for Synthroid®. Our Rule 23(f) petition seeking reversal of the district court’s certification of a class was granted, but the case settled. This was an appeal from the district court’s approval of the settlement. On appeal, the district court’s finding that the settlement was fair was upheld.
IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., No. 00-2009 (7th Cir.), argued January 23, 2001. Represented the SunAmerica defendants in this case, in which IDS accused the defendants of raiding its financial planners, in violation of their restrictive covenants. In this appeal (the second appeal argued in this case), the Seventh Circuit upheld the confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of defendants and rejected IDS’ claims that certain claims were not arbitrable.
United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., No. 00-1110 (7th Cir.), argued May 2000. Represented United in this contract dispute. The district court dismissed all of Mesa’s tort claims, on the ground that they were preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act, which preempts any state regulation of airline rates, routes or services. After allowing an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Save Our Little Vermilion Environment, Inc. v. Illinois Cement Co., No. 89204 (Ill. App. Ct.), argued October 1999. The issue in this case was whether limestone belonged to our client, Illinois Cement Co, which owns the surface or whether it belonged to the mineral estate. On appeal from a judgment against our client, successfully persuaded the Appellate Court to reverse and enter summary judgment in favor of Illinois Cement.
Bank of America v. Schulson, No. 1-97-2679 (Ill. App. Ct), argued February 1999. Represented the Bank in this action to collect on a guaranty. The Circuit Court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank, but applied a burn down provision in such a way that the guaranty was virtually worthless. The Appellate Court reversed, ordering judgment to be entered in favor of the Bank for the full amount of the guaranty.
Artiglio v. The Dow Chemical Co., No. S057133 (Cal. S. Ct), argued May 1998. Represented The Dow Chemical Company in this consolidated breast implant litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dow Chemical on all claims pending in state court in California, holding that Dow Chemical’s connection to the silicone used in breast implants was too tenuous to support the imposition of a duty. The California Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
Chicago ACORN v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority, No. 98-1939 (7th Cir.), argued in June 1998. Represented the Pier Authority in this case, dealing with whether Navy Pier is a public forum and the extent to which protest groups can use the Pier for First Amendment activities. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that large portions of the Pier are a public forum, accepting our argument that the entire Pier is a nonpublic forum, where expressive activity can be substantially curtailed. At the end of the opinion, Chief Judge Posner took the unusual step of complimenting counsel for both sides on what he described as their excellent briefs and oral arguments.
Mahlum v. The Dow Chemical Company, No. 28600 (Nev. S.Ct), argued April 1997. Appealed an individual breast implant case, in which Dow Chemical was found liable for approximately $4 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages, arguing that Dow Chemical was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. On December 31, 1998, the Nevada Supreme Court finally issued its opinion, granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Dow Chemical on the intentional tort claims and thus vacating the $10 million punitive award, but affirming, by a 3-2 vote, the compensatory damage award on the negligence claim.
Spina v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 97-1162 (Ill. App. Ct.), argued December 10, 1997. Represented Toyota Motor Credit in one of dozens of class action consumer fraud cases filed throughout the country, in which the plaintiffs claim that leasing companies violate the UCC by not paying interest on security deposits. Won a motion to dismiss on behalf of the finance company; the appellate court affirmed, holding that security deposits are not subject to the UCC.
Kocher v. Dow Chemical Company, No. 97-2071 (8th Cir.), argued November 18, 1997. Defended Dow Chemical in this individual jaw implant case in which the plaintiff sought damages from Dow under the same theories used in the breast implant cases. This case raised issues of federal jurisdiction and the standards to be applied to belated claims of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 60(b)(4). Prevailed on appeal, with the 8th Circuit affirming the judgment in Dow Chemical’s favor.
Consumer Systems Corp. v. Continental Bank of Buffalo Grove, No. 95-1844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.), argued July 7, 1997. Represented the Bank and Bank officers in this lender liability case that was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. The First District affirmed the dismissal and the Illinois Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal.
I/N Kote v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., No. 93 C 6525 (7th Cir.), argued October 1996. Represented I/N Kote, which is a joint venture partially owned by Inland Steel Company. The district court granted summary judgment against I/N Kote on a $20 million claim under a boiler and machinery policy. Won on appeal, when the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the entry of summary judgment on the key coverage issue in the case in favor of I/N Kote.
Burlington Northern RR Co. v. Estates of Red Wolf and Bull Tail, No. 96-35254 (9th Cir.), argued September 1996. Represented BN in this case, which arose out of a $250 million judgment entered against BN by the Crow Tribal Court, purportedly as compensatory damages for the deaths of two members of the tribe in a crossing accident. We filed this case in federal court in Montana to obtain a preliminary injunction against any attempt to enforce the judgment. The injunction was granted, but was overturned on appeal in a 2-1 decision on the ground that BN had not exhausted its tribal court remedies. Petitioned for certiorari and the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the decision and remanded for reconsideration. Ultimately, the tribal court judgment was vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In re New York Breast Implant Litig., No. 500,000/93 (NY App. Div), argued May 1996. Represented The Dow Chemical Company in this consolidated litigation arising out of alleged defects in breast implants manufactured by Dow Chemical’s 50%-owned subsidiary, Dow Corning. The Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dow Chemical.
In re TMJ Implant Litig., No. 95-2886 (8th Cir), argued June 1996. All federal cases involving personal injury claims arising out of jaw implants were consolidated in the District Court of Minnesota. Like the plaintiffs in the breast implant litigation, plaintiffs who received Dow Corning silicone jaw implants argued that Dow Chemical is somehow responsible for the alleged defects in that product. Plaintiffs relied on the same evidence and the same legal theories as the breast implant plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dow Chemical under the laws of all fifty states and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
In re Santa Fe Pacific Corporation Shareholders Litigation, No. 224, 1995, argued in the Delaware Supreme Court, in October 1995. Represented Santa Fe and its directors in this class action challenging Santa Fe’s merger with the Burlington Northern to form the largest railroad in the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that Santa Fe’s directors had violated their duty to disclose and duties under Revlon and Unocal. The Chancery Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed except with respect to the Unocal claim. On remand, the plaintiffs eventually gave up, voluntarily dismissing their sole surviving claim.
Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, No. 78806, argued in the Illinois Supreme Court in September 1995. Represented the McPier Authority in this challenge to taxes imposed on ground transportation providers to Chicago airports which were imposed to finance the expansion of McCormick Place. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upholding the tax in March 1996. Successfully argued in 1992 the first challenge to an MPEA tax, which was imposed on restaurants in the downtown area of Chicago in Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill.2d 248, 606 N.E.2d 1216 (1992).
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, mandamus petition argued in July 1995. Represented Lexecon and Professor Dan Fischel in this lawsuit accusing Milberg Weiss of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tortious interference and other torts arising out of the Lincoln Savings litigation. The case was transferred to Arizona for coordinated pretrial proceedings with Lincoln Savings; in May 1995, the district court transferred the case to itself permanently, invoking § 1404(a). Petitioned for mandamus on the ground that the practice of transferring MDL cases under § 1404(a) is unlawful in light of the plain language of § 1407, which required transferred cases to be remanded to the district where they were filed for trial. Judge Kozinski agreed with our position and would have granted the Petition; the other two members of the panel, however, found there was no emergent need for an immediate decision. After a final judgment in favor of defendants, raised this issue again in an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, losing once again on a 2 to 1 vote with Judge Kozinski dissenting. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the transfer issue. After the case was returned to the Northern District of Illinois, persuaded the district judge to reopen some of the claims that had previously been dismissed and fended off a petition for mandamus to the Seventh Circuit. The case was tried in 1999 and resulted in a highly-publicized $45 million verdict for Lexecon and a $50 million settlement just before the punitive damages phase of the trial was to begin.
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Education
University of Chicago Law School, JD, cum laude, 1976; Order of the Coif; Articles Editor, The University of Chicago Law Review Northwestern University, BA, 1973; Phi Beta Kappa
Admitted
United States Supreme Court, 1980
Illinois, 1976
US Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits
US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois |
